Abstract
Introduction
French support for European (EC/EU)-level macro-economic policy coordination has been driven by remarkably consistent preferences since the 1950s. With the exception of the de Gaulle decade This article sets out to explain these stable French preferences on European-level macroeconomic policy coordination over time through a combination of an interest-based analysis referring to structural and competitive weaknesses of the French economy and an ideational explanatory analysis focused upon French Keynesian thinking on symmetrical adjustment of both deficit and surplus countries. We argue that this consistency is remarkable and puzzling notably because other important features of French political economy, its model of capitalism and its macroeconomic policies experienced profound changes from the 1980s (Boyer 2002; Levy 1999; Schmidt 2002; Vail 2010) . French preferences align largely with the concept of 'embedded liberalism'. This article also interprets a number of developments in EU-level economic governance in response to the banking and sovereign debt crises that provided a policy window for France to move European-level mechanisms and institutions towards longheld French preferences.
The ideas behind French preferences: 'embedded liberalism', 'embedded currency area theory' and Keynesianism
The concept of 'embedded liberalism' has likely never been explicitly adopted by French policy makers. Nonetheless, it describes effectively French preferences on European integration, generally, and European-level macro-economic policy coordination specifically, and provides an analytical framework through which to understand these preferences.
'Embedded liberalism' has also inspired the concept of 'embedded currency area ' (McNamara 2015) which is relevant to our examination of French preferences on macro-economic policy coordination in the context of the euro area. John Ruggie's concept of 'embedded liberalism' (1982) describes the post-war Bretton Woods monetary and trade regime of gradual liberalisation and largely fixed exchange rates -designed to prevent participating countries from engaging in competitive devaluations. The founding provisions of the monetary system included a temporary escape clause for participating countries facing a situation of 'fundamental disequilibrium' -a condition in which a country faced a significant balance of payments deficit (not specifically defined) and downward pressure on its currency -allowing a national government to adjust its currency (devaluation) and introduce temporary capital controls. Balance of payments support (both precautionary and in the context of crisis) was provided notably through the International Monetary Fund. Ruggie describes embedded liberalism in the Bretton Woods regime as one of 'intergovernmental collaboration to facilitate balance-of-payments equilibrium, in an international environment of multilateralism and a domestic context of full employment ' (1982: 394-95) . This was an economic order that encouraged liberalization (opening of countries to international trade) but also allowed for national interventionism to achieve domestic macro-economic stabilization which was assigned legitimate social purpose. The concept of 'embedded liberalism' is based on an older concept first developed by Karl Polanyi (1944) of 'embedded versus disembedded economic orders'.
It is important for the purposes of our article to point out that the bulk of the burden of readjustment of the 'embedded liberalism' of the Bretton Woods System rested with the deficit countries. This reflected US government preferences at the time of the 1944 negotiations establishing the regime. However, many government participants in and observers of the Bretton Woods negotiations (notably John Maynard Keynes, the British government representative) sought the introduction of provisions ensuring the obligation of mutual readjustment for both creditor and debtor countries (Skidelsky 2000) . Keynes furthermore wanted a clearer definition of the point at which mutual readjustment should have to take place: he suggested a surplus or deficit of 3 per cent. Keynes sought to highlight the pernicious influence of the gold standard as it had operated in the interwar years. He argued that trying to achieve internal balance by deflating in response to a loss of reserves was not only harmful for the country itself but also had the external effect of depressing economic activity in other countries -leading to the race to the bottom seen in the Great Depression (Vines 2003; Skidelsky 2000) . Keynes wanted surplus countries to be required to curtail their imbalances in more or less the same way that deficit countries were obliged to curtail their imbalances under the gold standard. In his Clearing Union proposal developed during the Second World War, Keynes sought to impose taxes and sanctions on chronic surplus countries (Eichengreen and Temin 2010) . Burdens upon creditor countries were, however, avoided due to US government opposition. However, of particular relevance for future discussions on monetary cooperation and integration in Europe, Keynes insisted that an exchange rate system created obligations on both sides of the exchange rate relationship to contribute to its stability and smooth operation. The actions of surplus as well as deficit countries had systemic implications. Their actions mattered for the stability and smooth operation of the international system; they could not realistically assign all responsibility for adjustment to their deficit counterparts.
Keynesian thinking had strong currency in France after the Second World War especially among the modernizing technocratic elites and it was firmly anchored in the French grandes écoles where the bulk of the political, administrative and economic elites was trained.
1 French policy-makers could easily find arguments provided by Keynes when asking for a more symmetrical approach to macro-economic imbalances in the global and European currency systems. Of course, the general importance of Keynesian thinking for French economic policy-making changed over time. Starting with the 1970s' stagflation and the Barre adjustment plan in 1976 and later with the Socialist-led government's policy U-turn of 1983 towards a policy of 'competitive disinflation', Keynesian ideas lost currency in France as in other wealthy industrialized countries (Cameron 1995; Hall 1986; Uterwedde 1988) . In the aftermath of the international financial and euro area crisis, when Keynesian economic ideas gained renewed attention, both the centre-right president Nicolas Sarkozy and the center-left president François Hollande made only selective use of Keynesian ideas and instruments to reflate the economy (Clift 2012; . However, little change can be observed over time as regards to French preferences for a sharing of the burden of adjustment between current account deficit and surplus countries in order to reduce macro-economic imbalances and in its support of instruments of mutual support. In this respect, Keynesian thinking never lost its appeal. Indeed, Prime Minister Raymond Barre -who eschewed Keynesianism in his domestic economic policy -was very much in favour of the creation of a more symmetry exchange rate mechanism and a European Reserve Fund in order to help make domestic adjustment easier to manage economically and politically ).
The economic interests behind French preferences: tackling French deficits and challenging unilateral adjustment
French support for sharing the burden of adjustment between deficit and surplus countries was The decline and then collapse of the Bretton Woods system has been widely discussed in the literature. For some, this decline and collapse reflects the relative decline of the American hegemon -and its decreased willingness to assume the main burdens in the system (Keohane 1984) . This collapse of the 'embedded liberalism' rooted in the Bretton Woods system was followed by the rise of the 'Washington Consensus' with structural adjustment programmes inspired by neo-classical economics imposed by the IMF on governments facing large current account deficits and in need of emergency finance. European fund provided EMU-members access to non-automatic credit facilities in case of temporary balance of payments difficulties, and a Mutual System of Settlements created to encourage the settlement of international payments through the foreign exchange markets, rather than through central banks as had often previously been the case. The Mollet government found that these EMA-arrangements were not ambitious enough (Kaplan and Schleiminger 1989 Marjolin envisaged balance of payments support as an inherent part of the move to 'European
Monetary Union' (Seidel 2016) . In the first of three stages, member states would benefit from financial solidarity if they followed a code of good conduct. In the second phase, member state governments would be obliged to follow the recommendations by the Council, taken by qualified majority voting. All member states would be required to make available a certain percentage of their currency and gold reserves to provide credits to those member states with balance of payments difficulties. This could eventually -in a worst-case scenario -be extended to a 'total' solidarity in which member states would use larger parts of their reserves to support a member state in need. This 'total' solidarity reflected Keynesian thinking on mutual obligations for both deficit and surplus countries. By the end of stage two (duration left unspecified), Marjolin considered member states would be in a 'state of monetary union'.
His stage three was not spelled out.
In his second memorandum of 7 November 1958 -written with the assistance of Triffin who had become his advisor in DGII -Marjolin was more explicit and detailed about the structure of the ERF. However, he was also more cautious on supranationalism than in his
May memoranda, and Commission policy recommendations were no longer to be binding for member state governments. Financial solidarity was still on the agenda but the situation in 
The European Monetary System: bold plans, modest outcomes
In the negotiations leading to the creation of the EMS in 1979, the French sought to eliminate the asymmetry of the Snake through several mechanisms. First, the French wanted the new system to be built around a currency basket, with the ECU serving as pivot and a means of settlement between EEC monetary authorities. Second, the French wanted unlimited intramarginal interventions by strong currency central banks once a weak currency crossed a 'divergence threshold' (Howarth 2001: 40-41 (Ludlow 1982: 165) .
3
At the insistence of the Bundesbank and the Federal Ministry of Finance, the EMS design that was finally adopted turned out to be much less symmetrical than envisaged by French authorities (Kaltenthaler 1998: 53-54) . A bilateral parity grid system along the lines of the Snake was finally adopted and the deutschmark once again performed the function of an 
The move towards EMU and macro-economic coordination as fiscal consolidation
The January 1988 memorandum of the French minister of finance, Edouard Balladur, was unusually explicit in expressing key French concerns regarding EMS asymmetry: 'It must be avoided that one single country [i.e., Germany] has, de facto, the responsibility to fix the objectives of the economic and monetary policy of the entire system' (Balladur 1988: 18 and 20) . The memorandum advocated a two track approach: short-term EMS reforms combined with reflections on further steps in monetary integration to create 'a single currency', 'a common central institution', and 'federal banks in the individual countries'. Balladur saw these steps as being the logical consequence of the liberalization of capital markets, making the status quo untenable (Balladur 1988: 18 and 20 ; see also James 2012: 228).
In wage setting had to take the ECB's stability-oriented single monetary policy as 'given,' which would 'lead to implicitly coordinated policy outcomes ex post' (Issing 2002, 346 ; emphasis in the original). undermine disruptive speculative attacks against the franc and other weak European currencies back in the 1970s and 80s, they now advocated the creation of instruments to discourage speculation on euro area periphery sovereign debt and to reduce bond yields, with the fear of contagion to France. As in the pre-EMU past, French governments tried to find ways to avoid an economic policy convergence towards German 'austerity' policies, thus leaving room for French national policy autonomy and fiscal policy discretion. French governments thus, yet again, sought mechanisms to bring about a symmetrical adjustment of both surplus and deficit member states -instead of the asymmetrical adjustment of deficit countries, the deflationary macro-economic effects of which French governments feared.
French governments also tried to avoid, now as in the 1970s and 1980s, the growing power asymmetry inside Europe in favour of Germany, the macro-economic policy choices of which French governments were unable to influence -putting France in a situation of a 'policy taker' suffering from the negative economic consequences of Germany's unilateral decisions.
Nonetheless, the French also proved more successful than in the past in achieving reforms to economic governance which in effect softened the asymmetry of economic relations in the euro area and created more macro-economic policy margin of manoeuvre for deficit countries. (Feld et al. 2016: 3) . 9 For an in-depth elaboration of this argument, see the approach developed by the German Council of Economic Experts (2012: 37-43). 
